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Distributed Function Computation with
Confidentiality
Himanshu Tyagi†
Abstract—A set of terminals observe correlated data and
seek to compute functions of the data using interactive public
communication. At the same time, it is required that the value
of a private function of the data remains concealed from an
eavesdropper observing this communication. In general, the
private function and the functions computed by the nodes can
be all different. We show that a class of functions are securely
computable if and only if the conditional entropy of data given
the value of private function is greater than the least rate of
interactive communication required for a related multiterminal
source-coding task. A single-letter formula is provided for this
rate in special cases.
Index Terms—Balanced coloring lemma, distributed comput-
ing, function computation, omniscience, secure computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the following distributed function computation
problem with a confidentiality requirement. The terminals in
a set M = {1, ...,m} observe correlated data, and wish to
compute functions g1, ..., gm, respectively, of their collective
data. To this end, they communicate interactively over a
noiseless channel of unlimited capacity. It is required that this
communication must not reveal the value of a specified private
function g0 of the data. If such a communication protocol
exists, the functions g0, g1, ..., gm are said to be securely
computable. We formulate a Shannon theoretic multiterminal
source model that addresses the basic question: When are the
functions g0, g1, ..., gm securely computable?
Applications of this formulation include distributed com-
puting over public communication networks and function
computation over sensor networks in hostile environments.
In contrast to the classic notion of secure computing in
cryptography [21], we assume that the nodes are trustworthy
but their public communication network can be accessed by an
eavesdropper. We examine the feasibility of certain distributed
computing tasks without revealing a critical portion of the data
to the eavesdropper; the function gi, i = 1, ...,m, denotes
the computation requirements of the ith terminal, while the
critical data is represented by the value of private function g0.
As an example, consider a data download problem in a sensor
network. The central server terminal 1 downloads binary data
from terminals 2, ...,m, while the latter terminals compute the
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symbolwise maxima. An observer of the communication must
not learn of the data of terminals 2, ...,m.
The answer to the general question above remains open.
The simplest case of interest when the terminals in a subset
A of M compute only the private function g0 and those
not in A perform no computation was introduced in [19].
The data download problem, upon dropping the computation
requirements for terminals 2, ...,m, reduces to this setting. It
was shown that if g0 is securely computable (by the terminals
in A), then
H (XM|G0) = H (XM)−H (G0) ≥ R
∗, (1)
and g0 is securely computable if
H (XM|G0) > R
∗, (2)
where R∗ has the operational significance of being the min-
imum overall rate of communication needed for a specific
multiterminal source-coding task that necessitates the recovery
of entire data at all the terminals in A; this task does not
involve any security constraint (see Section II for a detailed
discussion). Loosely speaking, denoting the collective data
of the terminals by the random variable (rv) XM and the
random value of the function g0 by the rv G0, the maximum
rate of randomness (in the data) that is independent of G0 is
H (XM|G0). The conditions above imply, in effect, that g0 is
securely computable if and only if this residual randomness
of rate H (XM|G0) contains an interactive communication, of
rate R∗, for the mentioned source-coding task.
In this paper, for a broad class of settings involving the se-
cure computation of multiple functions, we establish necessary
and sufficient conditions for secure computation of the same
form as (1) and (2), respectively. The rate R∗ now corresponds
to, roughly, the minimum overall rate of communication that
allows each terminal to:
(i) accomplish its required computation task, and,
(ii) along with the private function value, recover the entire
data.
This characterization of secure computability is obtained via a
general heuristic principle that leads to new results and further
explains the results of [19] in a broader context.
Using the sufficient condition (2), we present a specific se-
cure computing protocol in Section IV with a communication
of rate R∗. Under (2), the secure computing scheme in [19]
recovered the entire data, i.e., the collective observations of
all the terminals, at the (function seeking) terminals in A
using communication that is independent of G0. In fact, we
observe that this is a special case of the following more general
2principle: a terminal that computes the private function g0,
may recover the entire data without affecting the conditions
for secure computability.
Unlike [19], we do not provide a single-letter formula for the
quantity R∗, in general; nevertheless, conditions (1) and (2)
provide a structural characterization of securely computable
functions in a broader setting, generalizing the results in [19].
A general recipe for single-letter characterization is presented
which, in Example 1 and Corollary 4 below, yields single-letter
results that are new and cannot be obtained from the analysis
in [19]. To the best of our knowledge, the general analysis
presented here is the only known method to prove the necessity
of the single-letter conditions for secure computability in these
special cases. Furthermore, for the cases with single-letter
characterizations, the aforementioned heuristic interpretation
of R∗ is made precise (see the remark following Lemma 2
below).
The algorithms for exact function computation by multiple
parties, without secrecy requirements, were first considered in
[20], and have since been studied extensively (cf. e.g., [8], [9],
[10]). An information-theoretic version with asymptotically
accurate (in observation length) function computation was
considered in [16], [11]. The first instance of the exact function
computation problem with secrecy appears in [15]. A basic
version of the secure computation problem studied here was
introduced in [18], [19]; [3] gives an alternative proof of the
results in [18], [19].
The problem of secure computing for multiple functions
is formulated in the next section, followed by our results in
section III. The proofs are given in sections IV and V. The final
section discusses alternative forms of the necessary conditions.
Notation. The set {1, ...,m} is denoted by M. For i < j,
denote by [i, j] the set {i, ..., j}. Let X1, ..., Xm, m ≥ 2, be rvs
taking values in finite sets X1, ...,Xm, respectively, and with
a known probability mass function. Denote by XM the col-
lection of rvs (X1, ..., Xm), and by XnM = (XM,1, ..., XM,n)
the n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). repetitions
of the rv XM. For a subset A of M, denote by XA the rvs
(Xi, i ∈ A). Given Ri ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let RA denote the
sum
∑
i∈ARi. Denote the cardinality of the range-space of
an rv U by ‖U‖.
Finally, for 0 < ǫ < 1, an rv U is ǫ-recoverable from an rv
V if there exists a function g of V such that Pr (U = g(V )) ≥
1− ǫ.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a multiterminal source model for function
computation using public communication, with a confiden-
tiality requirement. This basic model was introduced in [6]
in a separate context of SK generation with public transac-
tion. Terminals 1, . . . ,m observe, respectively, the sequences
Xn1 , . . . , X
n
m of length n. For 0 ≤ i ≤ m, let gi : XM → Yi
be given mappings, where the sets Yi are finite. Further,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ m and n ≥ 1, the (single-letter) mapping
gni : X
n
M → Y
n
i is defined by
gni (x
n
M) = (gi(x11, . . . , xm1), . . . , gi(x1n, . . . , xmn)),
xnM = (x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
m) ∈ X
n
M.
For convenience, we shall denote the rv gni (XnM) by Gni , n ≥
1, and, in particular, G1i = gi (XM) simply by Gi.
Each terminal i ∈ M wishes to compute the function
gni (x
n
M), without revealing gn0 (xnM), xnM ∈ XnM. To this end,
the terminals are allowed to communicate over a noiseless
public channel, possibly interactively in several rounds.
Definition 1. An r-rounds interactive communication protocol
consists of mappings
f11, ..., f1m, ...., fr1, ..., frm,
where fij denotes the communication sent by the jth node in
the ith round of the protocol; specifically, fij is a function
of Xnj and the communication sent in the previous rounds
{fkl : 1 ≤ k ≤ i− 1, l ∈M}. Denote the rv corresponding to
the communication by
F = F11, ..., F1m, ...., Fr1, ..., Frm,
noting that F = F(n) (XnM). The rate1 of F is 1n log ‖F‖.
Definition 2. For ǫn > 0, n ≥ 1, we say that functions2
gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm), with private function g0, are ǫn-
securely computable (ǫn- SC) from observations of length n,
and public communication F = F(n), if
(i) Gni is ǫn- recoverable from (Xni ,F) for every i ∈ M,
and
(ii) F satisfies the secrecy condition
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F) ≤ ǫn.
Remark. The definition of secrecy here corresponds to “weak
secrecy” [1], [13]. When our results have a single-letter form,
our achievability schemes for secure computing attain “strong
secrecy” in the sense of [14], [4], [6]. In fact, when we have
a single-letter form, our proof in section IV yields “strong
secrecy” upon minor modification.
By definition, for ǫn-SC functions gM, the private function
G0 is effectively concealed from an eavesdropper with access
to the public communication F.
Definition 3. For private function g0, we say that functions
gM are securely computable if gM are ǫn- SC from obser-
vations of length n and public communication F = F(n),
such that lim
n
ǫn = 0. Figure 1 shows the setup for secure
computing.
In this paper, we give necessary and sufficient conditions
for the secure computability of certain classes of functions
gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm). The formulation in [19], in which the
terminals in a given subset A of M are required to compute
1All logarithms are with respect to the base 2.
2 The abuse of notation gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm) simplifies our presentation.
3Fm
X
n
1 X
n
2 X
n
m
Gˆ
(n)
1 Gˆ
(n)
2 Gˆ
(n)
m
Interactive Communication F, 1nI (F ∧G
n
0) ≈ 0
F1 F2
Fig. 1. Secure computation of g1, ..., gm with private function g0
(only) g0 securely, is a special case with
gi =
{
g0, i ∈ A,
constant, otherwise.
(3)
It was shown in [19] that (1) and (2) constitute, respectively,
necessary and sufficient conditions for the functions above to
be securely computable, with R∗ being the minimum rate of
interactive communication F that enables all the terminals
in M to attain omniscience (see [6]), i.e., recover all the
data XnM, using F and the decoder side information Gn0
given to the terminals in M \ A. In fact, it was shown that
when condition (2) holds, it is possible to recover XnM using
communication that is independent of Gn0 .
The guiding heuristic in this work is the following general
principle, which is also consistent with the results of [19]:
Conditions (1) and (2) constitute, respectively, the necessary
and sufficient conditions for functions gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm) to
be securely computable, where R∗ is the infimum of the rates of
interactive communication F′ such that, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
the following hold simultaneously:
(P1) Gni is ǫn-recoverable from (Xni ,F′), and
(P2) XnM is ǫn-recoverable from (Xni , Gn0 ,F′), i.e., terminals
attain omniscience, with Gn0 as side information that is
used only for decoding (but is not used for the commu-
nication F′),
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞.
Thus, (P1) and (P2) require any terminal computing g0 to
become omniscient, an observation that was also made for
the special case in [19]. The first condition (P1) above is
straightforward and ensures the computability of the functions
g1, ..., gm, by the terminals 1, ...,m, respectively. The omni-
science condition (P2) facilitates the decomposition of total
entropy into mutually independent components that include
the random values of the private function Gn0 and the com-
munication F′. For the specific case in (3), R∗ above has a
single-letter formula. In general, a single-letter expression for
R∗ is not known.
Our results, described in section III, are obtained by simple
adaptations of this principle. Unlike [19], our conditions, in
general, are not of a single-letter form. Nevertheless, they
provide a structural characterization of secure computability.
As an application, our results provide simple conditions for
secure computability in the following illustrative example.
Example 1. We consider the case of m = 2 terminals that
observe binary symmetric sources (BSS) with underlying rvs
X1, X2 with joint pmf given by
Pr (X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = Pr (X1 = 1, X2 = 1) =
1− δ
2
,
Pr (X1 = 0, X2 = 1) = Pr (X1 = 1, X2 = 0) =
δ
2
,
where 0 < δ < 1/2. The results of this paper will allow us
to provide conditions for the secure computability of the four
choices of g0, g1, g2 below; it will follow by Theorem 1 that
functions g0, g1, g2 are securely computable if
h(δ) < τ,
and conversely, if the functions above are securely computable,
then
h(δ) ≤ τ,
where h(τ) = −τ log τ − (1− τ) log(1− τ), and the constant
τ = τ(δ) depends on the choice of the function. These
characterizations are summarized in the next table. Denote the
AND and the OR of two random bits X1 and X2 by X1.X2
and X1 ⊕X2, respectively.
g0 g1 g2 τ
X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 1/2
X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 φ 1
X1 ⊕X2, X1.X2 X1 ⊕X2, X1.X2 X1.X2 2δ/3
X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 X1.X2 2/3
The results for the first two settings follow from [19]. The
third and fourth results are new. In these settings, terminal 1
is required to recover the private function; our results below
show that the conditions for the secure computability in these
cases remain unchanged even if this terminal is required to
attain omniscience. Note that since h(δ) < 1 for all 0 <
δ < 1/2, there exists a communication protocol for securely
computing the functions in the second setting. By contrast, a
secure computing protocol for the functions in the third setting
does not exist for any 0 < δ < 1/2, since h(δ) > 2δ/3.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF SECURELY COMPUTABLE
FUNCTIONS
In this section, we characterize securely computable func-
tions for three settings. Our necessary and sufficient conditions
entail the comparison of H (XM|G0) with a rate R∗; the
specific choice of R∗ depends on the functions gM. Below
we consider three different classes of functions gM. Although
the first class is a special case of the second, the two are
handled separately as the more restrictive case is amenable
to simpler analysis. Furthermore, for m = 2, the obtained
necessary and sufficient conditions for secure computability
take a single-letter form in the first case (see Corollary 4).
(1) In the first class we consider, values of all the functions
4g1, ..., gm must be kept secret. In addition, at least one of
the terminals must compute all the functions g1, ..., gm. This
case arises in distributed function computation over a network
where all the computed values are collated at a single sink
node, and we are interested in securing the collated function
values. Alternatively, denoting the function computed at the
sink node by the private function g0, the computed functions
g1, ..., gm can be restricted to be functions of g0. Specifically,
for 0 < m0 < m, and for private function g0, let
gi =
{
g0, i ∈ [1,m0] ,
gi (g0) , i ∈ [m0 + 1,m] .
(4)
(2) The next case is a relaxation of the previous model in that
the restriction gi = gi (g0) for i ∈ [m0 + 1,m] is dropped.
For this general case, our analysis below implies roughly
that requiring the terminals [1,m0] that compute the private
function g0 to recover the entire data XnM does not change the
conditions for secure computability, which is a key observation
of this paper.
(3) The last class of problems we study is an instance of secure
multiterminal source coding, which arises in the data download
problems in sensor networks where each node is interested
in downloading the data observed by a subset of nodes.
Specifically, we consider the situation where each terminal
wishes to recover some subset XnMi of the sources where
Mi ⊆M\ {i}, i.e.,
gi (XM) = XMi , i ∈M. (5)
This last case appears to be disconnected from the previous
two cases a priori. However, our characterizations of secure
computability below have the same form for all cases above.
Moreover, the same heuristic principle, highlighted in (P1) and
(P2), leads to a characterization of secure computability in all
three cases.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for secure com-
putability are stated in terms of quantities R∗i (gM), i = 1, 2, 3,
which are defined next. The subscript i corresponds to case
(i) above. In particular, the quantity R∗ corresponds to the
minimum rate of communication needed for an appropriate
modification of the source-coding task in (P1), (P2). Below
we give specific expressions for R∗i , i = 1, 2, 3, along with
their operational roles (for a complete description of this role
see the sufficiency proof in Section IV).
Denote by R∗1 (gM) the closure of the (nonempty) set of
pairs3 (
R
(1)
F
,
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F)
)
,
for all n ≥ 1 and interactive communication F, where
R
(1)
F
=
1
n
H(F) +
1
n
m∑
i=m0+1
H (Gni |X
n
i ,F) + inf RM, (6)
with the infimum taken over the rates R1, ..., Rm satisfying
the following constraints:
3The first term accounts for the rate of the communication and the second
term tracks the information about Gn
0
leaked by F (see (11)) below
(1a) ∀L (M, [1,m0] * L,
RL ≥
1
n
H
(
XnL|X
n
M\L,F
)
;
(1b) ∀L (M, [1,m0] ⊆ L,
RL ≥
1
n
H
(
XnL|X
n
M\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
.
The quantity infn,FR(1)F corresponds to the solution of a
multiterminal source coding problem. Specifically, it is the
infimum of the rates of interactive communication that satisfy
(P1) and (P2) above (see [5, Theorem 13.15], [6]).
Next, let R∗2 (gM) denote the closure of the set of pairs(
R
(2)
F
,
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F)
)
,
for all n ≥ 1 and interactive communication F, where
R
(2)
F
=
1
n
H(F) + inf
[
R′[m0+1,m] +RM
]
, (7)
with the infimum taken over the rates R1, ..., Rm and
R′m0+1, ..., R
′
m satisfying the following constraints:
(2a) ∀L (M, [1,m0] * L,
RL ≥
1
n
H
(
XnL|X
n
M\L,F
)
;
(2b) for m0 < j ≤ m,
R′j ≥
1
n
H
(
Gnj |X
n
j ,F
)
;
(2c) ∀L ⊆M, [1,m0] ⊆ L, and L′ ⊆ [m0 + 1,m] with either
L 6=M or L′ 6= [m0 + 1,m],
R′L′ +RL ≥
1
n
H
(
GnL′ , X
n
L|G
n
[m0+1,m]\L′
, XnM\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
.
The quantity infn,FR(2)F corresponds to the solution of a
multiterminal source coding problem, and is the infimum of
the rates of interactive communication F′ that satisfy (P1) and
(P2) above, and additionally satisfies:
(P3) XnM is ǫn-recoverable from
(
Gnj , G
n
0 ,F
′
)
, m0 < j ≤ m.
This modification corresponds to the introduction of m−m0
dummy terminals, with the jth dummy terminal observing Gnj ,
m0 < j ≤ m (see section VI); the dummy terminals can be
realized by a terminal i in [1, ...,m0] that recovers XnM from
(Xni ,F). The conditions (P2) and (P3) above correspond to
the omniscience at the terminals in the extended model, with
Gn0 provided as side information only for decoding.
Finally, denote by R∗3 (gM) the closure of the set of pairs(
R
(3)
F
,
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F)
)
,
for all interactive communication F, where
R
(3)
F
=
1
n
H(F) + inf RM, (8)
with rates R1, ..., Rm satisfying the following constraints:
(3a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ∀L ⊆Mi ⊆M\ {i},
RL ≥
1
n
H
(
XnL|X
n
Mi\L
, Xni ,F
)
;
5(3b) ∀L (M,
RL ≥
1
n
H
(
XnL|X
n
M\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
.
As before, the quantity infn,FR(3)F corresponds to the infimum
of the rates of interactive communication that satisfy (P1) and
(P2) above.
Our main result below characterizes securely computable
functions for the three settings above.
Theorem 1. For i = 1, 2, 3, with functions g0, g1, ..., gm as in
the case (i) above, the functions gM are securely computable
if the following condition holds:
H (XM|G0) > R
∗
i (gM) . (9)
Conversely, if the functions above are securely computable,
then
H (XM|G0) ≥ R
∗
i (gM) , (10)
where
R∗i (gM) = inf
(x,0)∈R∗
i
(gM)
x, i = 1, 2, 3. (11)
Remark. Although the first setting above is a special case
of the second, it is unclear if for gM in (4) the quantities
R∗1(gM) and R∗2(gM) are identical (also, see Section VI).
In general, the multi-letter characterizations of secure com-
putability of gM above can have different forms. For case
(1) with m = 2, Corollary 4 below provides a single-letter
formula for R∗1(gM). However, a similar single-letter formula
for R∗2(gM) is not known.
Theorem 1 affords the following heuristic interpretation.
The quantity H (XM|G0) represents the maximum rate of
randomness in XnM that is (nearly) independent of Gn0 . On the
other hand, R∗i (gM) is an appropriate rate of communication
for the computation of gM; we show that latter being less than
H (XM|G0) guarantees the secure computability of gM.
Although the characterization in Theorem 1 is not of a
single-letter form, the following result provides a sufficient
condition for obtaining such forms. Denote by R(i)constant, i =
1, 2, 3, the quantity R(i)
F
for F = constant.
Lemma 2. For case (i), i = 1, 2, 3, if for all n ≥ 1 and
interactive communication F
R
(i)
F
≥ R
(i)
constant, (12)
then R∗i (gM) = R
(i)
constant = infn,FR
(i)
F
.
The proof is a simple consequence of the definition of
R∗i (gM) in (11). Note that R(i)constant has a single-letter form.
Remark. As mentioned before, the quantity infn,FR(i)F is the
infimum of the rates of interactive communication that satisfies
(P1), (P2) for i = 1, 3, and satisfies (P1)-(P3) for i = 2. Thus,
when the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, we have from Theorem
1 that gM are securely computable if
H (XM|G0) > R
(i)
constant,
and if gM are securely computable then
H (XM|G0) ≥ R
(i)
constant,
where R(i)constant is the minimum rate of communication that
satisfies (P1), (P2) for i = 1, 3, and satisfies (P1)-(P3) for
i = 2.
As a consequence of Lemma 2, we obtain below a single-
letter characterization of securely computable functions, with
m = 2, in a special case; the following lemma, which is a
special case of [7, Lemma B.1] (see also [12, Theorem 1]), is
instrumental to our proof.
Lemma 3. Let m = 2. For an interactive communication F,
we have
H(F) ≥ H (F|Xn1 ) +H (F|X
n
2 ) .
We next consider case (1) for two terminals.
Corollary 4. For m = 2, for functions g0, g1, g2 with g1 = g0
and g2 = g2 (g0), we have
R∗1 (gM) = H (X2|X1) +H (G2|X2) +H (X1|X2, G0) .
(13)
Proof: The constraints (1a) and (1b) satisfied by rates
R1, R2 in the definition of R(1)F are
R2 ≥
1
n
H (Xn2 |X
n
1 ,F) ,
R1 ≥
1
n
H (Xn1 |X
n
2 , G
n
0 ,F) ,
which further yields
R
(1)
F
=
1
n
[H (F) +H (Gn2 |X
n
2 ,F)
+H (Xn2 |X
n
1 ,F) +H (X
n
1 |X
n
2 , G
n
0 ,F)] . (14)
Thus, R(1)constant equals the term on the right side of (13). Upon
manipulating the expression for R(1)
F
above, we get
R
(1)
F
=
1
n
[H(F)−H (F|Xn1 )−H (F|X
n
2 , G
n
0 )
−I (Gn2 ∧ F|X
n
2 )] +R
(1)
constant. (15)
Further, since H (G2|G0) = 0, it holds that
I (Gn2 ∧ F|X
n
2 ) ≤ I (G
n
0 ∧ F|X
n
2 ) ,
which along with (15) yields
R
(1)
F
≥
1
n
[
H(F)−H (F|Xn1 )−H (F|X
n
2 )
]
+R
(1)
constant
≥ R
(1)
constant,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3. The result
then follows from Lemma 2.
We next derive simple conditions for secure computability
for the BSS in Example 1
Example 2. Consider the setup of Example 1, with g0 =
g1 = X1 ⊕ X2, X1.X2 and g2 = X1.X2. By Corollary 4
and the observation H (G2|X2) = h(δ)/2, we get R∗1 (gM) =
3h(δ)/2. Since H (X1, X2 | G0) = H (X1, X2 | X1 ⊕X2)−
H (X1.X2 | X1 ⊕X2) = δ, the characterization of secure
6computability claimed in Example 1 follows from Theorem
1.
Example 3. In the setup of Example 1, consider g0 = g1 =
X1 ⊕ X2 and g2 = X1.X2. This choice of g0, g1, g2 is an
instance of case (2) above. For an interactive communication
F, the constraints (2a), (2b), (2c) in the definition of R(2)
F
,
upon simplification, reduce to
R1 ≥
1
n
H (Xn1 |X
n
2 , G
n
0 , G
n
2 ,F) ,
R2 ≥
1
n
H (Xn2 |X
n
1 ,F) ,
R1 +R2 ≥
1
n
H (Xn1 , X
n
2 |G
n
0 , G
n
2 ,F) ,
R′2 ≥
1
n
H (Gn2 |X
n
2 ,F) .
Therefore, inf [R1 +R2 +R′2] with R1, R2, R′2 satisfying
(2a), (2b), (2c), is given by
1
n
[
H (Xn1 |X
n
2 , G
n
0 , G
n
2 ,F)
+ max {H (Xn2 |G
n
0 , G
n
2 ,F) , H (X
n
2 |X
n
1 ,F)}
+H (Gn2 |X
n
2 ,F)
]
,
which further gives
R
(2)
F
=
1
n
[
H(F) +H (Xn1 |X
n
2 , G
n
0 , G
n
2 ,F)
+ max {H (Xn2 |G
n
0 , G
n
2 ,F) , H (X
n
2 |X
n
1 ,F)}
+H (Gn2 |X
n
2 ,F)
]
. (16)
It follows from H (Xn1 |Xn2 , Gn0 , Gn2 ,F) = 0 that
R
(2)
constant = H (G2|X2)
+ max {H (X2|G0, G2) , H (X2|X1)}
=
h(δ)
2
+ max {δ, h(δ)} =
3
2
h(δ), (17)
as h(δ) > δ for 0 < δ < 1/2.
Next, note from (16) that for any interactive communication
F
R
(2)
F
≥
1
n
[H(F) +H (Xn2 |X
n
1 ,F) +H (G
n
2 |X
n
2 ,F)]
=
1
n
[H(F) +H (Xn2 |X
n
1 )
−H (F|Xn1 ) +H (G
n
2 ,F|X
n
2 )−H (F|X
n
2 )]
≥
1
n
[H(F)−H (F|Xn1 )−H (F|X
n
2 )]
+H (G2|X2) +H (X2|X1)
≥ H (G2|X2) +H (X2|X1) =
3
2
h(δ), (18)
where the last inequality above follows from Lemma 3. The
characterization in Example 1 follows from (17), (18), and
H (X1, X2|G0) = 1, using Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
IV. PROOF OF SUFFICIENCY IN THEOREM 1
Sufficiency of (9) for i = 1: We propose a two step protocol
for securely computing g0, g1, ..., gm. In the first step, for
sufficient large N , the terminals [1,m0] (g0-seeking termi-
nals) attain omniscience, using an interactive communication
F
′′ = F′′
(
XNM
)
that satisfies
1
N
I
(
GN0 ∧F
′′
)
≤ ǫ, (19)
where ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small. Next, upon attaining
omniscience, one of the terminals in [1,m0] computes the
following for m0 < j ≤ m:
(i) Slepian-Wolf codewords Fˆj = Fˆj
(
GNj
)
of appropriate
rates R′j for a recovery of GNj by a decoder with the
knowledge of XNj and previous communication F′′, and
(ii) the rvs Kj = Kj
(
XNj
)
of rates R′j that satisfy:∣∣∣∣ 1NH (Kj)−R′j
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ, (20)
1
N
I
(
Kj ∧G
N
0 ,F
′′,
{
Kl ⊕ Fˆl
}
m0<l≤j−1
)
≤ ǫ. (21)
Note that Kj⊕Fˆj denotes the encrypted version of the Slepian-
Wolf code Fˆj , encrypted with a one-time pad using the secret
key (SK) Kj . Thus, terminal j, with the knowledge of Kj , can
recover Fˆj from Kj ⊕ Fˆj , and hence can recover GNj . The
operation Kj ⊕ Fˆj is valid since the SK Kj has size greater
than ‖Fˆj‖. Furthermore, we have from (19) and (21) that
1
N
I
(
GN0 ∧ F
′′,
{
Kj ⊕ Fˆj
}
m0<j≤m
)
≤
1
N
I
(
GN0 ∧
{
Kj ⊕ Fˆj
}
m0<j≤m
| F′′
)
+ ǫ
≤
m∑
j=m0+1
1
N
[
log ‖Kj ⊕ Fˆj‖
− H
(
Kj ⊕ Fˆj | F
′′,
{
Ki ⊕ Fˆi
}
m0<i≤j−1
, GN0
)]
+ ǫ
≤
m∑
j=m0+1
1
N
[
H (Kj)
−H
(
Kj ⊕ Fˆj | F
′′,
{
Ki ⊕ Fˆi
}
m0<i≤j−1
, GN0
)]
+ 2ǫ
=
m∑
j=m0+1
1
N
[
H (Kj)
−H
(
Kj | F
′′,
{
Ki ⊕ Fˆi
}
m0<i≤j−1
, GN0
)]
+ 2ǫ (22)
≤ 3mǫ,
where the third inequality above uses (20) and the last inequal-
ity follows from (21). The equality in (22) follows from the
fact that Fˆj = Fˆj
(
GNj
)
is a function of GN0 , since Gj is a
function of G0. We note that this is the only place in the proof
where the functional relation between Gj and G0 is used.
Thus, the communication
(
F
′′,Kj ⊕ Fˆj ,m0 < j ≤ m
)
constitutes the required secure computing protocol for gM.
It remains to show the existence of F′′ and Kj , m0 < j ≤ m
that satisfy (19)-(21).
Specifically, when (9) holds for i = 1, we have from
7the definition of R∗1 (gM) in (11) that for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ0
(ǫ0 to be specified later), there exists n ≥ 1 and interactive
communication F = F (XnM) such that
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F) < ǫ, (23)
and
R
(1)
F
≤ R∗1 (gM) +
ǫ
2
,
where R(1)
F
is as in (6). This further implies that there exist
R1, ..., Rm satisfying (1a) and (1b) (for F) such that
1
n
H(F) +
1
n
m∑
i=m0+1
H
(
Gnj | X
n
j ,F
)
+RM ≤ R
∗
1 (gM) + ǫ.
(24)
Choosing
ǫ0 < H (XM | G0)−R
∗
1 (gM)− δ,
for some δ < H (XM | G0)−R∗1 (gM), we get from (23) and
(24) upon simplification:
1
n
m∑
i=m0+1
H
(
Gnj | X
n
j ,F
)
+RM + δ <
1
n
H (XnM | G
n
0 ,F) .
(25)
Next, for k ≥ 1, denote by Fk = (F1, ...,Fk) the i.i.d. rvs
Fi = F
(
XM,n(i−1)+1, ..., XM,ni
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Further,
let N = nk. In Appendix A, we follow the approach in
the proof of [19, Theorem 5] and use (25) to show that for
sufficiently large k there exists an interactive communication
F
′ = f ′
(
XnkM
)
of overall rate RM + δ/2 that satisfies the
following:
XnkM is ǫ-recoverable from
(
XNi ,F
k,F′
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m0,
and from
(
XNi ,F
k, GN0 ,F
′
)
for m0 < i ≤ m,
(26)
and further,
1
N
I
(
GN0 ,F
k ∧ F′
)
< ǫ. (27)
The proposed communication F′′ comprises F′,Fk, and con-
dition (19) follows from (23) and (27). Finally, we show the
existence of Fˆj and Kj , m0 < j ≤ m, as above. From the
Slepian-Wolf theorem [17], there exist rvs Fˆj = Fˆj
(
GNj
)
of
rates
R′j ≤
1
N
H
(
GNj | X
N
j ,F
k
)
+
δ
2m
, (28)
such that GNj is ǫ-recoverable from
(
XNj ,F
k, Fˆj
)
, m0 <
j ≤ m, for k sufficiently large. Suppose the rvs
Km0+1,Km0+2, ...,Kj of rates R′m0+1, R
′
m0+2, ..., R
′
j , re-
spectively, satisfy (20) and (21) for some j ≤ m− 1. Denote
by F′(j) the communication
(
F
′,Ki ⊕ Fˆi,m0 < i ≤ j
)
of
rate R(j) that satisfies
R(j) ≤ RM +
1
N
j∑
i=m0+1
H
(
GNi | X
N
i ,F
k
)
+ δ (29)
We have from (25)-(29) that
R′j+1 <
1
N
H
(
XNM | G
N
0 ,F
k
)
−R(j). (30)
Heuristically, since XNM is recoverable from
(
XNj+1,F
k,F′
)
,
(30) gives
1
N
H
(
XNj+1 | G
N
0 ,F
k,F′(j)
)
≈
1
N
H
(
XNM | G
N
0 ,F
k
)
−
1
N
H
(
F
′(j) | GN0 ,F
k
)
≥
1
N
H
(
XNM | G
N
0 ,F
k
)
−R(j)
> R′j+1.
Thus, a randomly chosen mapping Kj+1 = Kj+1
(
XNj+1
)
of
rate R′j+1 is almost jointly-independent of GN0 ,Fk,F′(j) (see
[4]). This argument is made rigorous using a version of the
“balanced coloring lemma” (see [2], [6]) given in Appendix
B. Specifically, in Lemma B1, set U = XNM, U ′ = XNj+1,
V = GN0 ,F
k
, h = F′(j), and
U0 =
{
xNM ∈ X
N
M :
xNM = ψj+1
(
xNj+1, f
′
(
xNM
)
,Fk, gn0
(
xNM
))}
,
for some mapping ψj+1, where f ′
(
XNM
)
= F′ is as in (26).
By the definition of F′,
Pr (U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− ǫ,
so that condition (B1)(i) preceding Lemma B1 is met. Con-
dition (B1)(ii), too, is met from the definition of U0, h and
V .
Upon choosing
d = exp
[
k
(
H (XnM|G
n
0 ,F)−
nδ
2m
)]
,
in (B2), the hypotheses of Lemma B1 are satisfied for ap-
propriately chosen λ, and for sufficiently large k. Then, by
Lemma B1, with
r =
⌈
exp
(
NR′j+1
)⌉
, r′ =
⌈
exp
(
NR(j)
)⌉
,
and with Kj+1 in the role of φ, it follows from (B4) that there
exists rv Kj+1 = Kj+1
(
XNj+1
)
that satisfies (20) and (21),
for k sufficiently large. The proof is completed upon repeating
this argument for m0 < j < m.
Sufficiency of (9) for i = 2: The secure computing protocol
for this case also consists of two stages. In the first stage, as be-
fore, the terminals [1,m0] (g0-seeking terminals) attain omni-
science, using an interactive communication F′′ = F′′
(
XNM
)
.
The second stage, too, is similar to the previous case and
involves one of the omniscience-attaining terminals in [1,m0]
transmitting communication Fˆj = Fˆj
(
GNj
)
to the terminals
j, for m0 < j ≤ m. However, the encryption-based scheme of
the previous case is not applicable here; in particular, (22) no
longer holds. Instead, the communication Fˆj now consists of
the Slepian-Wolf codewords for GNj given XNj , and previous
communication F′′. We show below that if (9) holds, then
8there exist communication F′′ and Fˆj , m0 < j ≤ m, of
appropriate rate such that the following holds:
1
N
I
(
GN0 ∧ F
′′, Fˆm0+1, ..., Fˆm
)
< ǫ,
for sufficiently large N .
Specifically, when (9) holds for i = 2, using similar manip-
ulations as in the previous case we get that for all 0 < ǫ < ǫ0,
there exist interactive communication F = F (XnM), and rates
R1, ..., Rm, R
′
m0+1, ..., R
′
m satisfying (2a)-(2c) (for F) such
that
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F) <
ǫ
2
,
and
RM +R
′
[m0+1,m]
+ δ <
1
n
H (XnM | G
n
0 ,F) , (31)
with δ < H (XM | G0)−R∗2 (gM)− ǫ0; (31) replaces (25) in
the previous case.
Next, for N = nk consider 2m − m0 correlated sources
XNj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and GNj , m0 < j ≤ m. Since
R1, ..., Rm, R
′
m0+1, ..., R
′
m satisfy (2a)-(2c), random map-
pings F ′j = F ′j
(
XNj
)
of rates Rj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and
F ′j+m−m0 = F
′
j+m−m0
(
GNj
)
of rates R′j , m0 < j ≤ m
satisfy the following with high probability, for k sufficiently
large (see [5, Lemma 13.13 and Theorem 13.14]):
(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, XnkM is ǫ-recoverable from(
F ′1, ..., F
′
m,F
k, Xnki
)
;
(ii) for m0 < j ≤ m, Gnkj is ǫ-recoverable from(
F ′j+m−m0 ,F
k, Xnkj
)
;
(iii) for m0 < j ≤ m, XnkM is ǫ-recoverable from(
F
′,Fk, Xnkj , G
nk
0
)
and from
(
F
′,Fk, Gnkj , G
nk
0
)
,
where Fk = (F1, ...,Fk) are i.i.d. rvs Fi =
F
(
XM,n(i−1)+1, ..., XM,ni
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It follows
from (31) in a manner similar to the proof in Appendix A
that there exist communication F ′j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m − m0 as
above such that
1
nk
I
(
Gnk0 ∧ F
′,Fk
)
< ǫ,
for sufficiently large k.
The first stage of the protocol entails transmission of
F
k
, followed by the transmission of F ′1, ..., F ′m, i.e., F′′ =(
F
k, F ′1, ..., F
′
m
)
. The second stage of communication Fˆj is
given by F ′j+m−m0 , for m0 < j ≤ m.
Sufficiency of (9) for i = 3: Using the definition of R∗3 (gM)
and the manipulations above, the sufficiency condition (9)
implies that for all 0 < ǫ < ǫ0, there exist interactive
communication F = F (XnM), and rates R1, ..., Rm satisfying
(3a), (3b) (for F) such that
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F) <
ǫ
2
,
and
RM + δ <
1
n
H (XnM | G
n
0 ,F) , (32)
for δ < H (XM | G0) − R∗3 (gM) − ǫ0. Denoting by Fk =
(F1, ...,Fk) the i.i.d. rvs Fi = F
(
Xni
n(i−1)+1
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
it follows from (3a) and (3b) that for N = nk the random
mappings F ′i = F ′i
(
Xnki
)
of rates Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, satisfy the
following with high probability, for k sufficiently large (see
[5, Lemma 13.13 and Theorem 13.14]):
(i) for i ∈ M, XnkMi is ǫ-recoverable from
(
F
′,Fk, Xnki
)
;
(ii) for i ∈ M, XnkM is ǫ-recoverable from(
F
′,Fk, Xnki , G
nk
0
)
.
From (32), the approach of Appendix A implies that there
exist F ′i , i ∈ M, as above such that
1
nk
I
(
Gnk0 ∧F
′,Fk
)
< ǫ,
for sufficiently large k. The interactive communication(
F
′,Fk
)
constitutes the protocol for securely computing gM,
where gi (XM) = XMi , i ∈M.
V. PROOF OF NECESSITY IN THEOREM 1
Necessity of (10) for i = 1: If functions gM are securely
computable then there exists an interactive communication F
such that Gni is ǫn-recoverable from (Xni ,F), i ∈M, and
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F) < ǫn, (33)
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞. It follows from the Fano’s inequality
that4
1
n
H (Gni | X
n
i ,F) < c1ǫn, i ∈ M. (34)
Using an approach similar to that in [6], we have from (33):
1
n
H (XnM)
=
1
n
H (Gn0 ,F) +
1
n
H (XnM | G
n
0 ,F)
≥
1
n
H (Gn0 ) +
1
n
H (F) +
1
n
H (XnM | G
n
0 ,F)− ǫn, (35)
=
1
n
H (Gn0 ) +
1
n
H (F) +
1
n
m∑
i=1
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
0 ,F
)
− ǫn. (36)
Next, for L (M, with [1,m0] * L, we have
1
n
H
(
XnL | X
n
M\L,F
)
=
1
n
H
(
XnL | X
n
M\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
+
1
n
H
(
Gn0 | X
n
M\L,F
)
≤
1
n
H
(
XnL | X
n
M\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn,
where the last step follows from (34) and the assumption that
gi = g0 for i ∈ [1,m0]. Continuing with the inequality above,
we get
1
n
H
(
XnL | X
n
M\L,F
)
≤
1
n
∑
i∈L
[
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn
]
, (37)
4The constants c1, c2, c3, c4 depend only on log ‖XM‖, m, m0 (and not
on n).
9Letting
Ri =
1
n
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn, i ∈M,
by (37) R1, ..., Rm satisfy (1a) and (1b) for F, whereby it
follows from (34) and (36) that
H (XM | G0)
≥
1
n
H(F) +
1
n
m∑
i=m0+1
H (Gni | X
n
i ,F) +RM − c2ǫn
≥ R
(1)
F
− c2ǫn,
where F satisfies (33). Taking the limit n→∞, and using the
definition of R∗1 (gM) we get H (XM | G0) ≥ R∗1 (gM) .
Necessity of (10) for i = 2: If gM are securely computable,
the approach above implies that there exists an interactive
communication F satisfying (33) and (34) such that, with
Ri =


1
n
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn, 1 ≤ i ≤ m0,
1
n
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
[m0+1,i−1]
, Gn0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn,
m0 < i ≤ m,
R′j = c1ǫn, m0 < j ≤ m,
we have by (35),
H (XM | G0)
≥
1
n
H(F) +
1
n
H (XnM | G
n
0 ,F)− ǫn
≥
1
n
H(F) +
1
n
m0∑
i=1
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
0 ,F
)
+
1
n
m∑
i=m0+1
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
[m0+1,i−1]
, Gn0 ,F
)
− ǫn
≥
1
n
H(F) +RM +R
′
[m0+1,m]
− c3ǫn. (38)
Furthermore, (34) and the assumption gi = g0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m0,
yield for [1,m0] * L (M that
1
n
H
(
XnL | X
n
M\L,F
)
≤
1
n
H
(
XnL | X
n
M\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn
≤
∑
i∈L, i≤m0
[
1
n
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn
]
+
∑
i∈L, i>m0
[
1
n
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
[m0+1,i−1]
, Gn0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn
]
= RL, (39)
and similarly, for [1,m0] ⊆ L ⊆ M, L′ ⊆ [m0 + 1,m], with
either L 6=M or L′ 6= [m0 + 1,m] that
1
n
H
(
GnL′ , X
n
L|G
n
[m0+1,m]\L′
, XnM\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
=
1
n
H
(
XnL|G
n
[m0+1,m]\L′
, XnM\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
≤
1
n
H
(
XnL | X
n
M\L, G
n
0 ,F
)
≤ RL +R
′
L′ , (40)
Therefore, (39), (34) and (40) imply that R1, ..., Rm,
R′m0 , ..., R
′
m satisfy (2a)-(2c) for F, which along with (38)
yields
H (XM | G0) ≥ R
(2)
F
− c3ǫn,
where R(2)
F
is as in (7), and F satisfies (33), which completes
the proof of necessity (10) for i = 2 upon taking the limit
n→∞.
Necessity of (10) for i = 3: If the functions gM in (5) are
securely computable then, as above, there exists an interactive
communication F that satisfies (33) and (34). Defining
Ri =
1
n
H
(
Xni | X
n
[1,i−1], G
n
0 ,F
)
+ c1ǫn, i ∈M,
similar manipulations as above yield
H (XM | G0) ≥
1
n
H(F) +RM − c4ǫn. (41)
Further, from (34) we get that R1, ..., Rm satisfy (3a) and (3b)
for F. It follows from (41) that
H (XM | G0) ≥ R
(3)
F
− c4ǫn,
where R(2)
F
is as in (8), and F satisfies (33), which completes
the proof of necessity (10) for i = 3 as above.
VI. DISCUSSION: ALTERNATIVE NECESSARY CONDITIONS
FOR SECURE COMPUTABILITY
The necessary condition (10) for secure computing given in
section III is in terms of quantities R(i)
F
, i = 1, 2, 3, defined in
(6), (7), (8), respectively. As remarked before, for i = 1, 3, the
quantity infFR(i)F is the infimum over the rates of interactive
communication that satisfy conditions (P1) and (P2). However,
this is not true for i = 2. Furthermore, although i = 1 is
special case of i = 2, it is not clear if the necessary condition
(10) for i = 2 reduces to that for i = 1 upon imposing the
restriction in (4). In this section, we shed some light on this
baffling observation.
First, consider the functions gM in (3). For this choice of
functions, denoting by R∗0 the minimum rate of interactive
communication that satisfies (P1) and (P2), the results in [19]
imply that (1) constitutes a necessary condition for secure
computability, with R∗ = R∗0.
Next, consider an augmented model obtained by introducing
a new terminal m + 1 that observes rv Xm+1 = g˜ (XM)
and seeks to compute gm+1 = ∅. Further, the terminal does
not communicate, i.e., observation Xnm+1 is available only for
decoding. Clearly, secure computability in the original model
implies secure computability in the new model. It follows from
the approach of [19] that for the new model also, (1) consti-
tutes a necessary condition for secure computability, with R∗
now being the minimum rate of interactive communication
that satisfies (P1) and (P2) when terminal m + 1 does not
communicate; this R∗ is given by
max{H (XM | g˜(XM), G0) , R
∗
0}.
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Note that the new necessary condition (1) is
H (XM | G0) ≥ R
∗
0 = max{H (XM | g˜(XM), G0) , R
∗
0},
which is, surprisingly, same as the original condition
H (XM | G0) ≥ R
∗
0.
Our necessary condition (10) for i = 2 is based on a
similar augmentation that entails introduction of m−m0 new
terminals observing gm0+1 (XM) , ..., gm (XM) (to be used
only for decoding). Now, however, this modification may result
in a different necessary condition.
APPENDIX A
From (25), we have
nRM +
δ
2
< H (XnM | G
n
0 ,F) ,
where R1, ..., Rm satisfy conditions (1a) and (1b). For each
i and Ri ≥ 0, consider a (map-valued) rv Ji that is uni-
formly distributed on the family Ji of all mappings Xnki →
{1, . . . , ⌈exp(knRi)⌉}, i ∈ M. The rvs J1, ..., Jm, XnkM are
taken to be mutually independent.
Fix ǫ, ǫ′, with ǫ′ > mǫ and ǫ + ǫ′ < 1. It follows from
the proof of the general source network coding theorem [5,
Lemma 13.13 and Theorem 13.14] that for all sufficiently large
k,
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM : X
nk
M is ǫ-recoverable from(
Xnki , jM\{i}
(
XnkM\{i}
)
, Zki
)
, i ∈ M
})
≥ 1− ǫ,
(A1)
where, for i ∈ M,
Zki =
{
F
k, j ∈ [1,m0] ,(
F
k, Gnk0
)
, m0 < j ≤ m.
Below we shall establish that
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM :
1
nk
I
(
jM(X
nk
M ) ∧G
nk
0 ,F
k
)
≥ ǫ
})
≤ ǫ′,
(A2)
for all k sufficiently large, to which end it suffices to show
that
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM :
1
nk
I
(
ji(X
nk
i ) ∧G
nk
0 ,F
k, jM\{i}
(
XnkM\{i}
))
≥
ǫ
m
})
≤
ǫ′
m
, i ∈ M, (A3)
since
I
(
jM
(
XnkM
)
∧Gnk0 ,F
k
)
=
m∑
i=1
I
(
ji
(
Xnki
)
∧Gnk0 ,F
k | j1
(
Xnk1
)
, . . . , ji−1
(
Xnki−1
))
≤
m∑
i=1
I
(
ji
(
Xnki
)
∧Gnk0 ,F
k, jM\{i}
(
XnkM\{i}
))
.
Then it would follow from (A1), (A2), and definition of ZM
that
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM : X
nk
M is ǫ-recoverable from(
Xnki , Z
k
i , jM\{i}
(
XnkM\{i}
))
, i ∈M, and
1
nk
I
(
jM(X
nk
M ) ∧G
nk
0 ,F
k
)
< ǫ
})
≥ 1− ǫ− ǫ′.
This shows the existence of a particular realization F′ of JM
that satisfies (26) and (27).
It now remains to prove (A3). Defining
J˜i =
{
jM\{i} ∈ JM\{i} : X
nk
M is ǫ-recoverable from(
Xnki , Z
k
i , jM\{i}
(
XnkM\{i}
)
,
)}
,
we have by (A1) that Pr
(
JM\{i} ∈ J˜i
)
≥ 1 − ǫ. It follows
that
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM :
1
nk
I
(
ji(X
nk
i ) ∧G
nk
0 ,F
k, jM\{i}
(
XnkM\{i}
))
≥
ǫ
m
})
≤ ǫ +
∑
jM\{i}∈J˜i
Pr
(
JM\{i} = jM\{i}
)
p
(
jM\{i}
)
,
since Ji is independent of JM\{i}, where p
(
jM\{i}
)
is
defined as
Pr
({
ji ∈ Ji :
1
nk
I
(
ji(X
nk
i ) ∧G
nk
0 ,F
k, jM\{i}
(
XnkM\{i}
))
≥
ǫ
m
})
.
Thus, (A3) will follow upon showing that
p
(
jM\{i}
)
≤
ǫ′
m
− ǫ, jM\{i} ∈ J˜i, (A4)
for all k sufficiently large. Fix jM\{i} ∈ J˜i. We take
recourse to Lemma B1 in Appendix B, and set U = XnkM ,
U ′ = Xnki , V =
(
Gnk0 ,F
k
)
, h = jM\{i}, and
U0 =
{
xnkM ∈ X
nk
M : x
nk
M = ψi
(
xnki , jM\{i}
(
xnkM\{i}
)
,
F
k
(
xnkM
)
, gn0 (x
n
M)1 (m0 < i ≤ m)
)}
for some mapping ψi. By the definition of J˜i,
Pr (U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− ǫ,
so that condition (B1)(i) preceding Lemma B1 is met. Con-
dition (B1)(ii), too, is met from the definition of U0, h and
V .
Upon choosing
d = exp
[
k
(
H (XnM|G
n
0 ,F)−
δ
2
)]
,
in (B2), the hypotheses of Lemma B1 are satisfied, for
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appropriately chosen λ, and for sufficiently large k. Then, by
Lemma B1, with
r = ⌈exp (knRi)⌉ , r
′ =
⌈
exp
(
knRM\i
)⌉
,
and with Ji in the role of φ, (A4) follows from (B3) and
(B4).
APPENDIX B
Our proof of sufficiency in Theorem 1 requires random map-
pings to satisfy certain “almost independence” and “almost
uniformity” properties. The following version of the “balanced
coloring lemma” given in [19] constitutes the key step in the
derivation of these properties.
Consider rvs U,U ′, V with values in finite sets U ,U ′,V ,
respectively, where U ′ is a function of U , and a mapping
h : U → {1, . . . , r′}. For 0 < λ < 1, let U0 be a subset
of U such that
(i) Pr (U ∈ U0) > 1− λ2;
(ii) given the event {U ∈ U0, h(U) = j, U ′ = u′, V = v},
there exists u = u(u′) ∈ U0 satisfying
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
= Pr (U = u | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) , (B1)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ r′ and v ∈ V . Then the following holds.
Lemma B1. Let the rvs U,U ′, V and the set U0 be as above.
Further, assume that
PUV
({
(u, v) : Pr (U = u | V = v) >
1
d
})
≤ λ2. (B2)
Then, a randomly selected mapping φ : U ′ → {1, . . . , r} fails
to satisfy
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v)×
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u′∈U ′:
φ(u′)=i
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v)−
1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 14λ,
(B3)
with probability less than 2rr′|V| exp
(
− cλ
3d
rr′
)
for a constant
c > 0.
Remark. Denoting by svar the left side of (B3), it follows
from [6, Lemma 1] that
log r −H(φ(U)) + I(φ(U) ∧ h(U), V ) ≤ svar log
r
svar
.
Since the function f(x) = x log(r/x) is increasing for 0 <
x < re, it follows from (B3) that
log r −H(φ(U)) + I(φ(U) ∧ h(U), V ) ≤ 14λ log
|U|
14λ
.
(B4)
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